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SWNCC 257/21/D

21 August 1949

Pages 134 - 142, 100

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STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

DIRECTIVE

AMBIGUITY TO U.S. ZONE, AUSTRIA, OF
POLICY OF PREVENTING DEPARTURE OF
SCIENTISTS AND TECHNICIANS

References: a. SWNCC 257/2/D
b. SWNCC 257/8
c. SWNCC 257/19
d. SWNCC 257/20/D

Note by the Secretariat

1. The enclosure, a memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is referred to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Europe in connection with their consideration of reference d.

2. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Europe will coordinate their report with the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A. D. REID

V. L. LOWRANCE

H. W. MOSLEY

Secretariat

SWNCC 257/21/D

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED-0270

TOP SECRET

ENCLOSURE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SM-6553
20 August 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Applicability to U.S. Zone, Austria, of Policy of Preventing Departure of Scientists and Technicians.

1. In W-97733 (Appendix "A" to SWNCC 257/1/D) the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, European Theater (CG USFET) was instructed to prevent the departure of German scientists and important technicians from the U.S. zone, except as required by existing arrangements with the United Kingdom, and not to permit further interrogation of German scientists and technicians by the French or Soviets as previously provided in paragraph 1 b of W-84276 (Appendix "B" to SWNCC 257/1/D). W-97733 was approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee by the memorandum in Appendix "A" of SWNCC 257/8. In that memorandum the Committee further agreed that permission for representatives of nations other than the occupying powers to interrogate German scientists and technicians should also be withheld. Instructions to that effect were transmitted to CG USFET in W-85613. The directive to CG USFET to prevent departure of German scientists and important technicians from the U.S. zone was an interim measure intended to hold available those whom it might be found feasible and desirable to exploit or to deny to other nations.

2. In the message in Appendix "B" CG USFET outlines the difficulties which he is encountering in carrying out his instructions concerning German scientists and technicians and submits recommendations on the subject. Appendix

SWNCC 257/8, 7c

- 134 -

Enclosure

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

"A" contains the interim reply made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The statement in that reply concerning a possible extension of the present interim program for exploitation relates to modifications of the War Department's PAPERCLIP program which were introduced into the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee by the War member in SWNCC 257/19.

3. In the message in Appendix "C", CG USFET asks whether the policy in W-97733 applies to the U.S. zone in Austria as well as to that in Germany. In the message in Appendix "D", the Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces of Occupation in Austria requests information as to the U.S. policy for handling Austrian, Hungarian, Rumanian, and Czechoslovakian scientists and technicians in the U.S. zone in Austria.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the recommendations and questions in Appendices "B", "C", and "D" be considered by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in conjunction with its reconsideration of policies for the exploitation and denial of German and Austrian scientists and technicians recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum 28-6441 (SWNCC 257/20/D) dated 5 August 1946, and any consideration they may give to an expansion of the PAPERCLIP program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that the Joint Intelligence Committee cooperate with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee to which the Appendices are referred.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,
Colonel, U. S. Army,
Secretary

Enclosures

SWNCC 257/21/D

- 136 -

Enclosure

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

FM0001-0272

APPENDIX "A"

MESSAGE FOR THE COMMANDER GENERAL
U.S. ARMY, EUROPEAN THEATER

State, War, and Navy Departments have been asked to reconsider exploitation of denial program, and your S 7005 (Appendix "B") has been referred to them for consideration in that connection. Pending decision, maintain closest feasible surveillance of scientists on your revised list and Joint Chiefs of Staff denial lists forwarded by Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency. Included in matters under consideration is an expansion of PAPERGLIP program for interior exploitation to provide also for denial and to increase to 1000 the total number of German scientists who may at one time be in the United States under the program, to increase the length of time each may remain in the United States under it, and to permit their families also to be brought in under the program. Suggest you prepare tentative plans for action in case program is expanded along those lines.

EWING 257/21/D

- 136 -

Appendix "A"

TOP SECRET

REF ID: A660273

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

From: Commanding General, U.S. Forces, European Theater
 To: Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Nr: S 7556 17 July 1946

Subject is denial and exploitation of German scientists and technicians. References: J.C.S. 1363 Series, U.S.S. 870 Series. AGWAR cables W 87317, dated 7 December 1945; W 97733, dated 19 February 1946; W 98408, dated 26 February 1946; W 98433, dated 28 March 1946; W 85738, dated 25 April 1946; W 86905, dated 27 April 1946; W 97016, dated 7 May 1946; W 89264, dated 25 May 1946; W 89880, dated 31 May 1946; USFET cables S 33190, dated 29 November 1945; S 2121, dated 26 February 1946; S 2459, dated 28 February 1946; S 2214, dated 30 April 1946; S 2215, dated 30 April 1946; S 2415, dated 23 April 1946; S 3442, dated 5 May 1946; S 4903, dated 31 May 1946.

1. In response to cables W 97733, dated 19 February 1946, and W 98408, dated 26 February 1946, a list of 834 German scientists and technicians was forwarded to Washington on 18 May 1946. A second list containing 869 names has been prepared for dispatch about 27 June 1946. These lists contain the names of scientists and technicians of outstanding prominence or ability based upon their reputation over a number of years, but naturally such a list will not contain the names of all those who may gain prominence during the next few years. In compliance with cable W 82433, dated 28 March 1946, a relatively large number of scientists and technicians are included who by background and training have little or no real military significance.

* J.C.S. 1363/10
 ** J.C.S. 1363/16

OWHCC 257/21/D

- 117 -

Appendix "B"

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

2. Changing conditions are making it exceedingly difficult to deny to personnel of Allied powers other than the United Kingdom direct or indirect contact with German scientists and technicians now under United States control in Germany. Since some of the factors involved may be unknown in Washington, the following is presented:

A. It is becoming increasingly more difficult to prevent international movement. This problem will become more acute from the denial aspect as further progress is made on relaxing of restrictions on international travel. Such restrictions may be removed in so far as British and French boundaries are concerned within a short period.

B. There is a large number of former Nazis and mandatory unemployables among those shown on the lists. These cannot now or later be employed in the United States zone of Germany except in the common labor category.

C. It has been the policy in the United States zone not to permit the establishment of favored groups. Actually it is felt that the establishment in this case of a favored group is no sure deterrent to international movement and contact.

D. The issuance of extra rations, fuel, and clothing alone will not deter movement of individuals or families. We cannot compete with rumored scales and extras offered by France and Russia.

E. The stand has been taken that the employing of all classes, including scientists and technicians, is a function of the German Government. Actually, in this case, the establishment of land research centers to employ all top scientists and technicians was discussed with the minister presidents who, though in favor of the idea, feel it will require months to accomplish.

F. Some German scientists have been contacted by the Russians through German mail channels, and doubtless the German has furnished in some cases the information requested of him.

It is therefore recommended that the names of important scientists of a few years hence appear on present lists. In fact, if all on lists were removed from the United States zone, Germany would of necessity have to bring forth a new group of specialists.

3. Some German scientists and technicians, including many of great military importance, already have disappeared and apparently now in Russia or the Russian zone. If Germans are taken, a number undoubtedly are assisting in the operation of underground transport plants in the Harz Mountains.

4. Since this is, of course, the greatest in mental knowledge, it would appear desirable to exercise pressure for work in the United States or United Kingdom unless the particular German is willing to relinquish it.

5. A number of important German scientists and technicians will be required to establish an economic balance in Germany and to effect the school system.

6. It is recommended here that German scientists and technicians are under United States control. Germany can be considered allied powers other than the United Kingdom only in the matter

A. Detention in camps within Germany under United States military guard.

B. Movement from Germany to the United States or United Kingdom.

7. It is therefore recommended:

A. Over-all plan of denial of scientists and technicians within United States zones of Austria and Germany be abandoned.

B. Those scientists and technicians who are determined to have attained unusual military significance in fields which may be detrimental to United States security were their services to become available to other nations be screened from the lists furnished Washington, and moved

TOP SECRET

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together with their families from Germany to the United States or United Kingdom.

G. That this headquarters immediately canvass all the above scientists in the United States zone for voluntary shipment to the United States and that the volunteers be shipped immediately.

End

NOTE: S 30190 is CM-IN-10364 (29 Nov 45)

S 2458 is CM-IN-6066 (28 Feb)

S 2121 is CM-IN-5477 (23 Feb)

S 2214 is CM-IN-5468 (20 Apr)

S 2213 is CM-IN-5431 (20 Apr)

S 2413 is CM-IN-4875 (24 Apr)

S 3442 is CM-IN-1394 (6 May)

S 4903 is CM-IN-6069 (31 May)

CM-IN-3602

(16 July 46)

SWNCC 257/21/D

- 140 -

Appendix "B"

TOP SECRET

REF ID: A66000

~~TOP SECRET~~

FM0001-0277

APPENDIX "C"

From: Commanding General, U.S. Forces, European Theater

To: Joint Chiefs of Staff

Ref: C 2214

20 April 1946

Reference your cable W-82437 28 March, paragraph 2. Is the United States occupied zone of Austria to be included in the policy of preventing departure of scientists and technicians? Request that Headquarters, U.S. Forces of Occupation in Austria, be informed of action desired and that this headquarters receive information copy of such instructions.

End

CM-IN-4268

(20 Apr 46)

SMUC 257/21/D

- 141 -

Appendix "C"

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

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APPENDIX "D"

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces of Occupation in Austria
To: Joint Chiefs of Staff
Ref: P-7826 6 May 1946

Reurad W-97733 dated 20 March 1946, directed to USFET.
Request War Department policy or authority in handling in
United States zone of Austria of Austrian, Hungarian, Rumanian,
and Czechoslovakian scientists and technicians similar to that
set forth in paragraphs one, two, and three of your W-97733 re-
garding German scientists.

End

CM-12-1413

(6 May 46)

WMOG 257/21/D

- 142 -

Appendix "D"

TOP SECRET

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